Following Basu's (1995 Basu's ( , 1997 seminal work 1 , accounting literature adopted the Basu coefficient to measure conditional conservatism (among others, Ball et al. 2003; Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Lobo and Zhou 2006; Chandra et al. 2004) . However, Basu's choice of proxy for measuring the arrival of good/bad news, stock returns, introduces inaccuracy in the measure of conditional conservatism (Dietrich et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; Givoly et al. 2007 ).
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Introduction
The conservative principle, defined as the more timely recognition of unrealized losses vs. gains in annual earnings, has characterized for centuries the practice of accounting reporting (Basu 1997) .
Despite its widespread adoption over time and in different countries, however, the concept is somewhat counter-intuitive. Why do we have rules mandating the prompt recognition of expected losses, but delay the recognition of gains until they are (1) realized or realizable and (2) earned 2 ?
Instead, would a timely recognition of all the available news be more informative to users of financial statements, and thus preferred? Indeed, recently the US Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), jointly with the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), stated:
Neutrality is incompatible with conservatism, which implies a bias in financial reporting information. […] Conservative or otherwise biased financial reporting information is equally unacceptable. 3
This issue has been the basis for eminent academic research since Basu's influential work (Givoly et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; LaFond and Watts 2007; Guay 2006; Ryan 2006; Choi et al. 2006; Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Watts 2003a Watts , 2003b Ryan and Zarowin 2003) . Indeed, the understanding of the motivations and determinants of conditional conservatism is central to gaining insights in the role of financial reporting in debt contracting, managerial compensation, firm valuation, and institutional settings.
However, many important questions remain unanswered and more empirical issues need to be addressed. Has the analysis of conditional conservatism been exhaustive in identifying all the factors that might explain its widespread adoption? Is Basu's coefficient the appropriate measure of 2 conditional conservatism to study its variation over time, firms, and countries? The term timeliness refers to the interval of time that intercurs between the time a given piece information -news -about a firm's future increase/decrease in earnings become available and the time the same information appears in the firm's periodic financial statements. Prior research found an asymmetric difference in the information timeliness, conditionally to its content: good news (i.e., information associated with a future increase in earnings) takes longer than bad news (i.e., information associated with a future decrease in earnings) to appear in the firm's financial statements.
The empirical problem is that it is not possible to track directly each single piece of public information about a company. Researchers need to find a measurable and observable variable to use as a proxy. So far, following Basu, many researchers adopted stock returns as a proxy to measure the public flow of firms' good/bad news. Specifically, Basu uses "negative and positive unexpected annual stock returns to proxy for 'bad news' and 'good news ', respectively" (1997) . If the price of the stock at the end of a period is greater than the price at the beginning of the period, then Basu assumes that over the period good news (somehow quantified) about the company is greater than bad news.
Despite its widespread adoption, as recent literature highlights, there are economic and econometric limits of Basu's model and measure of conservatism (Dietrich et al. 2007; Givoly et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) . The problems stem from the choice of stock returns as proxy for good/bad news. Many of the factors that trigger a reaction in Basu's proxy variable-i.e. stock price increases or decreases -are related to events that a firm's accounting system cannot and will not record, because general market factors, or because not associated with the firm's under analysis.
Hence, they will not appear as an increase or decrease of earnings in the firm's actual financial statement, nor will it happen in the future. These "non accounting" factors act only as a disturbance term -noise -in the attempt to measure the differential timeliness of good/bad news about the firm's 3 future earnings, introducing a noisy signal in the measure of asymmetric timeliness, hence in the measure of conditional conservatism (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) . 4 To reduce the noise, hence increasing the accuracy of the measure, I propose to adopt the number of revisions in financial analysts' EPS forecasts as a new proxy of the flow of good/bad news about a company. Financial analysts gather all available information, but use only the part that is going to be recognized in future earnings (Nichols and Wahlen 2004) to revise their EPS estimates. 5 Acting as a filter, analysts reduce the noise that characterizes stock returns as a proxy for good/bad news. The new proxy, able to capture the arrival of good and bad "accounting 6 " news about the firm's future earnings, together with the use of a Lease Absolute Deviation (LAD) regression and the extension of the analysis time horizon to three years will result in a more precise, a priori, measure of conditional conservatism.
Once I demonstrate that this measure of asymmetric timeliness is, a priori, less noisy (thus more precise), I can test whether determinants suggested by previous literature -managerial, debt contracting, and auditor's choice -are still able to explain the reasons for conditional conservatism. I test (1) whether companies with a higher debt-to-asset ratio, where bondholders detain more power, are characterized by higher conditional conservatism. Next, I test (2) whether companies in which executives' compensation is more heavily based on firms' accounting performances are characterized by higher conditional conservatism. Finally, I test (3) whether there is an association between auditors, auditor opinions, and the company's lagged conditional conservatism. 4 Let's assume, for example, that over a given period there is only one piece of information about firm A's future earnings, and that the content of the information suggests that firm A's earnings will grow in the next period (for instance, a positive net present value project that firm A will start in the following period). If in the current period the market experiences a decrease, then the variable adopted as a proxy for good/bad news flow -stock returns -might also decrease, suggesting the arrival of a flow of bad news for firm A. Instead, the only real "accounting" news about firm A is good news. In the following period firm A will recognize the increase of earnings in its financial statement coming from the positive NPV project, but the traditional conservatism model will not be able to measure the timeliness of good news, because the proxy variable adopted signaled the arrival of bad news instead. 5 I adopt here the three theoretical links between earnings and share prices developed by Beaver (1998) : current period earnings provide information to predict the future periods' earnings, which provide information to forecast dividends in future periods, which provide information to determine stock prices, equal to the present value of future dividends.
Results of the paper provide evidence supporting the results obtained adopting a modified version of the Basu's measure (Ball and Kothari 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) , indirectly confuting the conceptual and econometric criticism to the Basu's model, mainly by Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2007) . More specifically, the paper provides evidence that that (1) companies characterized by a high debt-to-asset ratio, contrary to expectations, recognize good news about future earnings as quickly as bad news. These companies, which are closer to default in debt provisions than companies with low leverage ratio, are more likely to take higher risks and "manage" earnings through a relatively faster recognition of expected gains (good news), in order to reduce the chances of defaulting the requirements of debt indentures, thus reducing the asymmetric timeliness that I find for the rest of the sample. Additionally, (2) companies with executives compensations more heavily based on the company's accounting performances do consistently exhibit aggressive accounting, defined as expected gains recognized in annual earnings faster than losses. This provide evidence consistent with a relative higher power of the firm's executives (who have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to increase an annual compensation package based on the firm's accounting performance) over shareholders, who have incentives to enforce conservative accounting to reduce the chances of overpaying the firm's management. Furthermore, (3a) companies that in the previous year were audited by one of the big 7 auditing firms, and (3b) firms that received an unqualified auditor opinion show a higher conditional conservative behavior than the rest of the sample. Finally, over a reduced sample of 6,282 firm-year observations, I find that companies receiving an auditors' opinion qualified with a going concern assumption applied aggressive accounting in the year prior to the going concern opinion but became highly conservative in the year the qualified opinion was issued and the following year. Significantly, during the year of the going concern opinion and the following year, these firms turned around to adopt conservative accounting, even stronger than the other firms in the sample.
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The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews prior research. Chapter 3 describes the hypotheses tested in the paper. Chapter 4 provides a short description of the sample and details its descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 outlines the research design and provides results. Chapter 6 performs some sensitivity analyses. Chapter 7 concludes and points to future avenues for research.
Prior Research

Conservatism Determinants
Previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2007; Watts 2003a; suggests five alternative explanations for conservatism in financial reporting. The first explanation is its use as efficient technology employed in firm governance. A conservative accounting approach is used to deal with the moral hazard determined by the asymmetric information, limited liability, and asymmetric payoffs of the different parties involved in the firms, e.g. management compensation and debt contracts. The second possible explanation for accounting conservatism is limiting shareholders' litigation. Overstating a firm's net assets is more likely to increase the litigation costs for the firm than understating net assets. Thus, with conservatism, the firm reduces its expected litigation costs. The third possible explanation is taxation; in profitable firms, conservatism reduces the present value of taxes 7 , thus increasing the value of the firm. The fourth possible explanation of conservatism in financial reporting is standard setters' and regulators' incentives. Both standard setters and regulators are exposed to asymmetric loss functions because they would be more criticized if they adopt accounting standards that favor overstatement of net assets instead of understatement of net assets.
Finally, the fifth reason for conservatism in financial accounting is theoretically introduced and 6 empirically tested recently by LaFond and Watts (2007) 8 . They argue that conditional conservatism may serve as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry among the various parties (managers, shareholders, investors, stakeholders in general) involved in firms' contracts, litigation, taxation, and regulation processes. Much of the information asymmetry arises from the firm's investment opportunity sets, but it also occurs because of the way the firm's management, more informed about events and investment opportunities, formally collects and reports information to stakeholders. The two common denominator factors in the economic explanation of accounting conditional conservatism are the asymmetry of both the loss functions and information sets that characterize the different categories of stakeholders. (1997, 1995) tests conditional conservatism by regressing annual accounting earnings on stock returns for the same year separately for companies with negative returns and positive returns, adopting returns as a proxy for bad/good news. He predicts, and actually finds, a higher coefficient and a higher R square for the bad news sample than for the good news sample. Following Basu (1997), a great body of literature analyzing accounting conservatism adopted his framework in identifying and measuring conditional conservatism in its most important consequence, namely the asymmetric timeliness of expected gains and losses in reported earnings.
Empirical Research Results
Basu
Among the early researchers, Ryan and Zarowin (2003) investigate the reasons for a decline in the linear relation between annual stock returns and accounting earnings over the past 30 years. They 7 found evidence supporting two related explanations: 1) earnings reflect news with a lag with respect to stock prices, and 2) earnings increasingly over time reflect good and bad news in an asymmetric way.
On the same issue Pope and Walker (1999) present evidence of growing asymmetry over time in accounting earnings.
More recently, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) propose a theory and provide supporting empirical results to explain the relation between asymmetric timeliness (conditional conservatism) and market-to-book ratio (unconditional conservatism). When returns are driven by changes in rents and unverifiable net assets changes, then the measure of conservatism introduced by Basu (1997) is not very accurate. Roychowdhury and Watts suggest that asymmetric timeliness is a better measure of conservatism when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple years.
Ryan (2006) argues that, despite the limitations documented in the literature and highlighted at the end of this section, asymmetric timeliness is the most direct consequence of conditional conservatism.
Hence, asymmetric timeliness should retain its primacy in the literature investigating conditional conservatism. The author offers four specific suggestions for estimating asymmetric timeliness and for interpreting it as a measure of conditional conservatism. Among them, Ryan (2006) suggests to filter returns when they are used as a proxy to assess asymmetric timeliness, in order to mitigate the proxy biases arising from sampling of an endogenous variable. (Dietrich et al. 2007 ). -U.S. high-tech firms (Chandra et al. 2004 ), because they are subject to more stringent accounting standards (SFAS 2) and higher shareholders' litigation risk;
-public and larger firms in the U.K. (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) ;
-firms audited by one of the Big "X" (Krishnan 2005) , with longer auditor tenure (Jenkins and Velury 2006) , after an audit partner rotation (Hamilton et al. 2005) and with the accounting expertise (but not with non-accounting expertise) of the audit committee members (Krishnan and Gnanakumar 2006 Dietrich et al. (Dietrich et al. 2007 ) criticize the use of the asymmetric timeliness measure to test the hypothesis that reported accounting earnings are "conservative." The authors identify econometric properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure that cause biases in the test statistics, unless restrictive conditions are met. These biases arise from the sampling formation procedure on an endogenous variable 11 -returns -and the consequent distributional properties of the truncated sample.
They conclude that because the biases originate in the asymmetric timeliness specification design itself, alternative measures such as negative non-operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000) , market-10 The model assumes earning news equal to the sum of cash flow news and accruals news. 11 Returns, indeed, can be affected by earning information, generating endogeneity in the Basu regression.
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to-book ratio (Feltham and Ohlson 1995) , and change in cash investments (Easton and Pae 2004) should be adopted to further investigate accounting conservatism.
Adoption of Number of Analysts' EPS Estimate Revisions as a Replacement of Market Returns Proxy
To measure conditional conservatism I will adopt Basu's definition -the accountants' tendency to require a higher degree of verification for the recognition of good news in earnings than bad newswithin the framework based on the theory of conservatism in accounting illustrated by Watts (2003b Watts ( , 2003a and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) 12 .
However, following Basu and using stock returns as a proxy for good and bad news about firms' future earnings creates two main economic and econometric problems.
First, if returns on the market are driven by the value or changes in the value (good and bad news) of rents 13 or unobservable increases in the value of separable net assets, these changes will never be included in reported earnings. Indeed, accounting recognizes increases in separable asset values when they are completely verifiable but does not recognize changes in rents, nor increases in unobservable separable net assets (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) . If this is true, then the asymmetric timeliness approach that Basu adopts will measure conditional conservatism with error (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) , because of the noise introduced by the choice of the variable market returns as a measure of good/bad news about firms' future earnings. Basu's regression approach, indeed, works only if returns summarize news from sources other than accounting earnings and the news can be, at least in 12 In this framework, the objective of accounting is to assess, at a point in time, the firm's value available for interim distribution to the company's claimants (shareholders, bondholders, employees, other stakeholders), and not to measure the market value of the shareholders' equity. The accounting system, as we can observe in practice, pursues this objective through the adoption of rules that recognize increases in separable asset values only when they are completely verifiable. This definition of the object of measure is key to understanding why the variable traditionally used as a proxy of good/bad news about the firm's future earnings (returns to investors) introduces noise in the assessment of conditional conservatism. 13 Where rents are defined, following the guidance of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) , as growth options and monopoly returns.
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principle, recognized in earnings in the same period (Ryan 2006) . Rents, however, are only recognized in the accounting system when they are acquired, not when they are generated inside the firm.
Additionally, changes in rents are recognized only for decreases in acquired rents, and not always consistently (cfr. SFAS 142). Returns, finally, may not reflect all non-accounting information available, may reflect good and bad news depending on the firm's disclosure policies, or may be driven by the information content of earnings, creating an endogeneity problem in the Basu regression.
Ryan's conclusion is that: "it would be preferable to estimate asymmetric timeliness using measures of news other than returns" (Ryan 2006 ).
The second problem with Basu's framework has been highlighted in Dietrich et al. (2007) . They argue that Basu's model, reversing the relation of accounting (reported earnings) and non-accounting information driving the firm's stock price, and adopting instead accounting information as the dependent variable in the regression of reported earnings on changes in the firm's stock price (returns), causes two types of biases: sample-variance-ratio bias and sample truncation bias. The regression coefficient estimates suffer from these two biases, one arising from the regression specification and one arising from sampling on an endogenous and asymmetrically distributed variable (returns).
Although those biases can be negligible, as Ryan (2006) points out, at least one of the two is related to the adoption of returns, an endogenous variable, as a measure of news and treated in the model as an independent variable. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) , in an attempt to deal with the problem of using market returns as a proxy for good/bad news, adopt instead cash flow from operations as a proxy for good/bad news about future firm's earnings. However, cash flow from operations shows (i) asymmetric timeliness, (ii) is affected by different accounting choices, (iii) is part of earnings (causing an endogeneity problem more serious than the returns proxy), and (iv) is highly correlated with accruals.
To address these problems I adopt the number of financial analysts' estimates of earnings per share (EPS) raised/lowered over the period as a new proxy. Every time an accounting or non-accounting piece of information reaches the market, financial analysts evaluate the impact of the good/bad news on future EPS and revise (or not) their EPS estimates. This measure of news offers a few advantages over the traditional returns proxy:
-There is no reason to believe, a priori, that the distribution of the number of analysts' estimate revisions is non symmetric, which would address, partially, the issues raised by Dietrich et al. (2007) . Indeed, ex post, the symmetry plot of the change in analysts' estimates suggests that the variable exhibits a symmetric distribution around a mean value of -1, confirmed by the skewness value of the distribution equal to -0.049.
-Adopting the number of analysts' estimate revisions in EPS does attenuate the endogeneity problem of using returns as a proxy. Changes in EPS estimates for year t+1 from one day after the end of the fiscal year t until the end of fiscal year t+1 should not, indeed, influence the annual reported earnings of year t. This will address Ryan's suggestion (Ryan 2006 ) of using measures of news that do not involve returns, or filtering returns removing the portion in windows around earnings announcements to limit the endogeneity problem.
-The number of changes in EPS estimates should be less noisy than the returns on the market in measuring the good/bad news. This measure will reflect all, and only, the pieces of information (news) that will impact the firm's future earnings and that will have a chance to be recorded in annual earnings over the years, based on the analysts' professional judgment.
-Finally, this addresses the concerns of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) about empiricists measuring the asymmetric timeliness over horizons not including the firm's IPO, thus ignoring that the composition of the shareholders equity at the start of the year influences the annual timeliness 12 measure. The new variable that I propose to adopt is a change variable that include in its initial value (current forecasted EPS) all the pieces of information available at that time.
The new approach uses the new proxy in association with a quantile (or Least Absolute Deviation)
regression. This allows for a more precise measure of conditional conservatism, capturing the underlying asymmetry in the timeliness in the recognition of good/bad news in annual reported earnings. Indeed, quantile regression assumes that analysts deal with a linear loss function, trying to minimize their absolute forecast error instead of the square of the forecast error, as in the OLS case. 
Hypotheses
New Measure of Conservatism
The first hypothesis that I test in the paper is whether, using a different proxy for good/bad news within the Basu intuitive framework, I still find asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of good/bad news in reported earnings. If, by adopting the new proxy, the asymmetry disappears, then Dietrich et al. (2007) were correct in attributing the results found with the Basu model to the econometric biases highlighted above. However, if by using the new proxy (which reduces the magnitude of the two biases related to the adoption of returns as a proxy for good/bad news), the asymmetric timeliness persists, then the asymmetric timeliness research design cannot be considered invalid.
14 The LAD estimator, LAD β (n-element column vector), minimizes the sum of the absolute errors. While the OLS regression provides unbiased estimators of the mean of the dependent variable conditional on the independent variables, the LAD regression (or, more generally, quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett 1978) ) provides unbiased estimates of the median (n quantile) of the dependent variable conditional on the independent variables. When the dependent variable and the model errors are distributed symmetrically and the errors are independent from the explanatory variables adopted, both OLS and LAD yield estimates of the same parameter vector. In this case, researchers usually choose the estimator with the lower variance. The variance of the estimator depends on the kurtosis of the error distribution. OLS provides a lower variance estimator in the case of normal distribution, while the LAD estimator is characterized by lower variance with fat tails distributions (Basu and Markov 2004; Newey and Powell 1987) . Prior literature (Basu 1995; Frecka and Hopwood 1983) provides evidence that scaled earnings distribution is left-skewed, which might suggest that the conditional distribution of the dependent variable in model (1), scaled earnings, is skewed too.
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To test for asymmetric timeliness, I use the piecewise regression approach of Model (1), with a dummy equal to one when the number of EPS revisions downward over the period is higher than the number of revisions upward, which means that over the fiscal year, analysts received more bad news about future earnings than good news. However, since the independent variable is now related to the analysts' forecast revisions, a quantile regression is more appropriate than the traditional OLS regression. Indeed, previous literature found that analysts seem to process public information regarding their earnings forecasts in a somewhat biased way, due to "analysts' optimism" (Ramnath et al. 2006 ). Because of their optimism, I expect analysts to overvalue the good news and include it fairly quickly in their forecast revisions. Hence, upon running a traditional OLS regression, I expect the interaction variable coefficient ( 1 β ) in the model to be statistically equal to zero. This analysts' inefficiency disappears if, instead of an OLS regression, researchers use a quantile (or least absolute deviation, LAD) regression (Basu and Markov 2004) . Thus, I expect to find the interaction coefficient 14 The explanation for conditional conservatism due to debt contracting implies that debt-holders require the firm to adopt high conservative accounting standards to avoid the distribution of a firm's wealth to other claimholders in case of the firm's financial default. If this is the correct theory to explain conservatism in accounting, then, all else equal, I would expect a higher conservatism for firms with high leverage (higher proportion of debt over equity) than for firms with low leverage. This leads to the second hypothesis tested in this paper:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high leverage exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms with low leverage.
The managerial contracting theory explains the adoption of conditional conservative accounting standards and practice as an attempt by the shareholders to avoid overcompensating the firm's managers based on future expected gains before these gains actually translate into positive cash flow for the firm. The more the executives' compensation packages are based on the firm's accounting performances, the more I would expect shareholders to ask for the adoption of more conservative accounting practices. On the other hand, the more executives' compensation packages are based on the firm's accounting performances (in the form of bonuses), the more I would expect the executives to use aggressive accounting, recognizing expected gains more quickly than losses in earnings, to increase their compensation. Then, the third hypothesis I test in the paper is:
Hypothesis 3: Firms with compensation contracts for executives highly dependent on the firm's accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms with compensation contracts not based on the firm's accounting performance .
Previous literature (Basu 1997 ) also found that changes in the level of conservatism over time were likely due to a change in the auditors' legal liability exposure. When auditors are more exposed to the risk of being sued in relation to their work, they tend to require the client firms to be more conservative. After auditors state a going concern opinion, then, I would expect the clients to adopt very rigorous conservative accounting standards, to reduce the risk of legal liability for the auditors and for the management. This leads to the fourth hypothesis that I test in the paper: news, Diff, is positively correlated with the size of the company, as measured by total assets value (DATA6 of Compustat), with the scaled earnings variable after winsorizing (X/Pwin) and with the firm's market value of equity, while it is negatively correlated with the leverage ratio (Lev).
Research Design and Empirical Results
I propose to analyze accounting conservatism with a model of earnings deflated by beginning-ofperiod market value on the difference in the number of upward and downward revisions in analysts'
EPS estimates over the fiscal year (Model 1): extend the analysis to two-year and three-year time horizons. Fourth, I control in the regression for
NumEst it-j,t , the number of analysts that are following the company throughout the year, as an indirect control of the firm's size, or visibility.
Hypothesis 1
To test the first hypothesis I estimate Model (1) winsorizing the variable X it-j,t /P it-j-1,t-1 and returns to investors at the first and 99 th percentile values to reduce the influence of outliers.
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I compare the results obtained estimating Model (1) using OLS and LAD regressions with the original Basu model/variables regression results, for the three time horizons corresponding to j=0, j=1, and j=2. As expected, Table 2 shows that, when I estimate Model (1) with a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression, the analysts' optimism (Ramnath et al. 2006) When I adopt a LAD regression, to take into consideration the linear loss function that previous research identified as more appropriate for financial analysts (Basu and Markov 2004; Clatwhrthy et al. 2006) , I consistently find, as expected, a positive and significant value for the coefficient of the interaction term over all the time horizons (equal to 0.000289, t value of 7.31 for j=0, 0.000268, t value of 5.14 for j=1, and equal to 0.000260, t value of 3.93 for j=2). Results for the LAD regression show a consistent presence of conditional conservatism over the three time horizons. If I adopt the relative measure of asymmetry that has been used in the accounting literature since Basu (1997) , calculating the ratio of (β 1 +β 0 )/β 0 to measure how much faster bad news is recognized in reported annual earning than good news, I find that bad news is recognized in reported earnings respectively 7.1 times (for 20 j=0), 4.5 times (for j=1) and 3.0 times (for j=2) faster than good news. There is an evident decreasing trend in the asymmetric timeliness 20 when the analysis is extended from one to three-year horizon, suggesting, again, that the extension of the time horizon recommended by Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) is appropriate. If I run the traditional Basu model over the sample (with returns as a proxy for good/bad news), I find results consistent with the presence of conservatism as in the original Basu model, thereby indirectly validating the sample adopted in this study.
Hypothesis 2
To test the hypothesis of increase in conditional conservatism associated with increase in the importance of debt as a source of financing for the company operations, I subdivide the sample in quartiles based on the leverage ratio (Lev it ) for firm i at time t, calculated as firm's total debt (DATA9+DATA34 of Compustat) divided by total assets (DATA6 of Compustat). Then, I measure the conditional conservatism in the lowest and highest quartile with Model (1) running a LAD regression ( where all the variables are defined above, and Lev it-j,t is the leverage ratio. Consistent with results from previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2006), I expect to find a higher level of conservatism (higher coefficient estimate for β 1) from Model (1) for companies with high leverage ratio (Table 3 Panel B) than for companies with low leverage ratio (Table 3 Panel A) . I also expect a significant and positive value for the estimate of the coefficient β 5 , in Model (2), which shows how bad news is recorded in annual reported earnings more quickly than good news for companies with higher leverage ratio (Table   3 Panel C).
Results for firms in the lowest quartile (Table 3 Panel A), with a low annual debt-to-assets ratio (leverage ratio mean value equal to 0.0158), show for Model (1) a positive and significant interaction coefficient estimate β 1 (equal to 0.00025, T value of 1.96 for j=2), providing evidence of conditional conservatism, i.e. bad news recognized in annual earnings more quickly than good news. Results for firms in the highest leverage ratio quartile (Table 3 Panel with a high leverage ratio (closer to default in debt provisions than companies with low leverage ratio) are more likely to take higher risks and "manage" earnings, through a relatively faster recognition of expected gains, in order to reduce the chances of not meeting the requirements included in the debt indentures. This behavior would cause a reduction in the level of conservatism in their annual reported earnings.
Hypothesis 3
To test the third hypothesis, I gather data from the Executive Compensation ( Third, I compute Exe as the ratio of SALARY+ALLOTHTOT divided by the total annual compensation (SALARY+BONUS+ALLOTHTOT) and use it as an index of the incentives for executives to use an aggressive accounting practice, recognizing unrealized gains more quickly than unrealized losses in the annual reported earnings, with the aim to increase their total annual compensation. The lower the index, the higher the incentives for executives to adopt aggressive accounting practice. Managers can increase their total annual compensation, for example, by accelerating the recognition in actual earnings of future unrealized gains, within GAAP rules. On the other side of the coin, shareholders know about these incentives. In fact, previous literature provided evidence that shareholders enforce more stringent conservative accounting rules as the firm executives' incentives to adopt aggressive accounting practices increase (Watts 2003a (Watts , 2003b . The aim is to reduce the probability of overpaying the firm's managers.
To test the hypothesis that firms with compensation contracts for executives highly dependent on the firm's accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms with compensation contracts not dependent on a firm's performance, I adopt the following model, modifying Model (1) with the introduction of a new variable Exe to measure the incentives of the firm's executives to adopt a more timely recognition of unrealized gains than losses in annual earnings (Model 3): All the variables are defined above. I expect to find the coefficient of the interaction term β 5 negative and statistically significant, indicating that, as previous literature pointed out (Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2006) , one of the determinants of conditional conservatism in accounting is its use by shareholders as an efficient form of firm governance, particularly in management compensation contracts. The higher the executive ratio index value (Exe), the higher the portion of the total annual compensation that does not depend on firm accounting performances. Hence, I would expect the incentives for shareholders to ask for a rigorous enforcement of conditional conservatism to decrease in response to the decrease in the executives' incentives to recognize good news more quickly than bad news in the annual reported earnings.
[Insert table 4 about here] Table 4 shows that, contrary to the expectations, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term β 5 for Model (3) is positive and significant at 5% level in the two-year time horizon (j=1), and in the three-year time horizon (j=2), while it is not statistically different from zero in the one-year time horizon (j=0). This provides evidence that firms implementing executive compensation more dependent on a firm's accounting performances recognize unrealized gains in earnings in a more timely manner than losses, i.e. aggressive accounting. The results seem to confirm the relative power of the firm's executives over shareholders. Indeed, executives have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to increase their annual compensation package, particularly when the annual package heavily depends on bonuses based on the firm's accounting performance, while shareholders have incentives to enforce conservative accounting rules to reduce the chances of overpaying the firm's management.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 (a) and (b) tests the association between the auditors' firm and opinion at the time t-1, and the level of conditional conservatism at time t. Moreover, it tests the association between auditors' going concern opinion at time t-1, t, and t+1 and the level of conditional conservatism at time t.
Among firms with auditors' opinion code 4, we find companies that just changed their accounting policies from the previous year and companies where auditors qualify their opinion with a going concern assumption. Data about auditors' opinions qualified with a going concern assumption (GCO) come from the Audit Analytics database.
To test this hypothesis, I adapt Model (1) To test the association between going concern opinions and conditional conservatism, I adopt
Model (4b): I would expect that, after receiving a clear opinion with explanatory language (Code 4), a company will exhibit a higher conditional conservatism than other companies in the sample, to lower the legal liability risk for the firm's auditor and managers. However, it should be noted that "better" companies, who received a clear opinion from auditors the previous year (Code 1) might already start from a higher level of conditional conservatism than companies that receive a clear opinion but with explanatory language. In this case, indeed, the auditor acknowledges that something in the firm's financial reporting might raise concerns, and feels the need to explain why. I would expect, furthermore, that companies with aggressive accounting behaviors (recognizing annual earnings of expected gains faster than losses) would switch their behavior to a more rigorous accounting conservatism after receiving a going concern opinion from their auditors, to reduce the risk of legal liability for both the auditors and the management in case of bankruptcy or default on debt provisions. There is evidence (the coefficient estimate for the interaction coefficient β 5 in Model (4) is positive and significant at the 10% confidence level) of more timely recognition of bad news than good news in reported earnings for companies that received an unqualified opinion (Code 1) than for companies that received an unqualified opinion with explanatory language. Again, if I adopt the relative measure of asymmetry and calculate the ratio of (β 1 +β 0 )/β 0 to measure how much faster bad news is recognized in reported annual earning than good news, I find that firms that received a Code 1 audit opinion 27 recognize bad news in financial statements 11.6 times faster than good news, while firms that received a Code 4 opinion from their auditors recognize bad news in financial statements only 3.6 times faster than good news 22 . The results are not surprising because firms that received a clear audit opinion (Code 1) already exhibit a starting higher level of conditional conservatism than other firms, as shown when I use the contemporaneous auditor opinion variable instead of the lagged value in Model (4) (untabulated results). been qualified with the going concern assumption. Results show that companies that in the next year will receive an auditor's opinion qualified with the going concern assumption were less conservative,
i.e. more aggressive from an accounting point of view, than the rest of the companies in the sample, with a coefficient β 5 in column (3) negative and statistically significant, equal to -0.007 (T value of 2.06). In other words, these companies were recognizing unrealized gains faster than unrealized losses in annual earnings. However, the accounting behavior of these firms changes the year they receive a going concern opinion from the auditors (and the year following it) with bad news recognized in the annual earnings more quickly than good news (the estimate of coefficient β 5 for column 1 and 2 is positive and highly significant). Table 5 Panel C reports results for companies that hired one of the Big 7 audit firms vs. companies that were audited by a smaller audit firm. Results provide evidence of the presence of conditional conservatism. Companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms (the Big 4 plus other three firms) recognize bad news in reported earnings two times faster than good news. Companies who were audited the previous year by one of the Big 4 audit firms (untabulated results) recognize bad news in reported earnings 6.2 times faster than good news. When I compare the conservative behavior of companies that the previous year were audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms vs. smaller audit firms, I
find strong evidence that companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms are characterized by higher levels of conditional conservatism than companies that were audited by smaller firms. Indeed, the estimate of the interaction coefficient β 5 for model (5) is positive and statistically significant (0.000247, T value of 2.00).
Sensitivity Checks
In this section I will run again a few data analyses to ensure the results in the previous section are not dependent on the specific methodology adopted in the paper.
Fiscal Year Return
I run the Basu model again, calculating returns over the fiscal year instead of for the period between nine months before and three months after the fiscal year end. Model (1a) is:
where all the variables are defined as in chapter 4, and R it-1,t , is the buy-and-hold returns of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99 th percentile values, calculated as the increase in the price of stock (P it, from CRSP) over the period starting the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending at the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the stock price at the end of the period, t-j-1. Results, untabulated, are similar and consistent with the results for the Basu model described above in Chapter 4 and tabulated in Table 2 , column (3), (6), and (9).
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Fama-Macbeth Regression
To check if results presented in the paper are dependent on the particular regression model adopted (LAD regression), I run the analysis again adopting a Fama-Macbeth regression model, consistent with previous literature (LaFond Roychowdhury and Watts 2007) . This approach runs an OLS regression for each year across the firms in the sample, and averages the estimated regression coefficient over the time series considered. As expected, since the Fama-Macbeth regression uses an OLS approach, results over the one-year horizon (j=0) show a non-significant coefficient estimate for the interaction term β 1 in Model (1a), consistent with the results tabulated in Table 2 column (3).
Change in the Cut-off Point to Create the Dummy Variable
One of the problems previous literature (Dietrich et al. 2007 ) finds in the asymmetric timeliness approach to measuring conditional conservatism is that the sub-samples good/bad news about future cash flow are not created at the mean value of the proxy variable adopted. In my findings, the mean value for the variable Diff is -0.96 across the sample for the one-year, -1.95 for the two-year, and - This new cut-off point does not make, in my opinion, economic sense. When a company received, over the two-year period, one more EPS downward forecast revision than upward revision, even if this result is better than the average of the value of Diff for all the companies in the sample, it still means that the market received one more negative news about the firms future earnings than positive news. It would be a mistake to consider that company in the "good news" sample if we stick to the definition of good news as having more news about unrealized gains than losses.
big 4/7 audit firms and the other companies in the sample (interaction coefficient β 5 in Model (5) is equal to 0,00002, T value equal to 0.2).
Conclusion and Future Research
Following Basu's (1997) seminal work, accounting literature adopted the Basu single-period model to measure conditional conservatism. However, the proxy chosen to measure the arrival of good/bad news about firms' future earnings, the price of the stock, can vary due to factors that will never be recorded in firms' reported earnings over the years. This unreliability introduces economic and econometric biases into the analysis (Dietrich et al. 2007 ) and causes inaccuracy in the measure of conditional conservatism. To overcome the problem, I introduce a new measure of conditional conservatism, applying a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression and adopting the number of changes in financial analysts' EPS forecasts as a proxy for good/bad news about future earnings and extending the analysis to two-year and three-year time horizons.
Results of the paper provide evidence supporting the recent results obtained adopting a modified version of the Basu measure, confuting the conceptual and econometric criticism to the Basu model, mainly by Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2007) . The study provides evidence that that (1) companies characterized by a high debt-to-asset ratio, contrary to expectations, recognize good news about future earnings as quickly as bad news. Additionally (2) companies with executives compensated more heavily based on the company's accounting performances do consistently exhibit an aggressive accounting behavior, recognizing expected gains in annual earnings faster than losses. Furthermore (3a) companies that in the previous year were audited by one of the big 7 audit and (3b) firms that received an unqualified auditor opinion without explanatory language show a more conditional conservative behavior than the rest of the sample. Finally, over a reduced sample of 6,282 firm-year 31 observations, I find that companies receiving an auditors' opinion qualified with the going concern assumption applied an aggressive accounting behavior in the year prior to the going concern opinion but became highly conservative in the year the qualified opinion was issued and the following year. Where: X/P it, and X/Pwin it (winsorized at the first and 99 th percentile values) is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year t, divided by the market value of equity (MktVal it equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199). Diff it is the difference between the sum of the upward (f_up it ) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_down it ) in the analysts' EPS forecast for firm i over the fiscal period t (from First Call database). R it , and Rwin it (winsorized at the first and 99
th percentile values) is the buy-and-hold annual returns, calculated as the increase in the price of stock (P it, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal end of the year, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period
. SALARY it is the sum of the total salary, BONUS it is the sum of the total bonus, and SUMOTH it is the sum of all other annual compensation paid to the executives for firms i in year t. Lev it is the leverage ratio and it is calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each year. MB it is the Market-to-book ratio calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided by DATA60. Finally, data6 it is the total value of assets and data25 it is the number of shares outstanding for each company i in year t, from Compustat. Where: The dependent variable, X it-j,t /P it-j-1,t-1 , is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99 th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktVal it ) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199). Diff it-j,t is the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward (f_up it-j,t ) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_down it-j,t ) in the analysts' EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). D it-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise. NumEst it-j,t is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year. For the OLS models based on Basu framework, (model 3, 6, and 9), R it-j,t , is the buy-and-hold returns of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99
th percentile values, calculated as the increase in the price of stock (P it, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the stock price at the beginning of the period, t-j-1, and D it-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if R it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report results for the 1 year Where: The dependent variable, X it-j,t /P it-j-1,t-1 , is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99 th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktVal it ) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199. Diff it-j,t is the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward (f_up it-j,t ) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_down it-j,t ) in the analysts' EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database). D it-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise. The executive ratio (Exe it-j,t ) is calculated as ExecuComp SALARY + all other annual compensation (SUMOTH), divided by total current compensation (SALARY+BONUS) + all other annual compensation (SUMOTH) for each year. Data are at firm level, as I sum the salary, all other annual compensation, and total annual compensation for all the executives in the company for each year. For j=1, it's the average of the executive ratio over the two-year period, and for j=2 it's the average of the executive ratio for the company for the three-year period. NumEst it-j,t , finally, is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year, that I adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher number in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts following it, but from the number of good/bad news about the company future earnings. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Where:
The dependent variable, X it /P i,t-1 , is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value for year t, winsorized at the first and 99 th percentile values. It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktVal it ) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199). Diff it is the difference between the sum of the upward (f_up it ) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_down it ) in the analysts' EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call database). D it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it <0, equal to zero otherwise. NumEst it-j,t , finally, is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year. Audit opinion codes are: 0. Financial statements are unaudited 1. Unqualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect no unresolvable restrictions and auditor has no significant exceptions as to the accounting principles, the consistency of their application, and the adequacy of information disclosed 2. Qualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect the effects of some limitation on the scope of the examination or some unsatisfactory presentation of financial information, but are otherwise presented fairly. We assign this code when a company is in the process of liquidating (even if opinion is not actually qualified) or when an opinion states that the financial statements do not present fairly the financial position of the company 3. Disclaimer of or No Opinion. Auditor refuses to express an opinion regarding the company's ability to sustain operations as a going concern 4. Unqualified Opinion With Explanatory Language. Auditor has expressed an unqualified opinion regarding the financial statements but has added explanatory language to the auditor's standard report 5. Adverse Opinion. Auditor has expressed an adverse Columns (1) reports the results of the LAD regression for companies that received an auditor opinion code 1 vs. code 4 at time t-1. No company in the sample reports a code equal to 3 or 5, and there are only 4 observations for companies receiving an audit opinion code 2 and 7 observation for companies with unaudited financial statements (code 0). 
